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GOVERNMENTCONTROLOFCROSS-BORDER
M&A: LEGITIMATEREGULATIONOR
PROTECTIONISM?
Andreas Heinemann*
ABSTRACT
Recently, much light has been shed on the conditions under which Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) inflows are beneficial to the receiving state and its
citizens. However, when inbound FDI takes the form of cross-border mer-
gers and acquisitions (M&As, as opposed to ‘greenfield investment’), nations
often see their interests affected. Whereas favouring domestic over foreign
ownership is restricted to the field of national security in some countries,
other governments seem to perceive a general threat with any takeover from
abroad. Accordingly, an increasing number of states have installed control
mechanisms that attempt to screen cross-border takeovers for their compati-
bility with national interests. This article consists of both a legal and an
economic analysis. First, an inventory is made of national policy instruments
that provide a nation with control over the takeover of domestic firms by
foreign investors. Second, we examine the extent to which national control
instruments are compatible with international economic law, including re-
gional integration agreements. Third, we discuss the economic reasons for
cross-border M&A and the reasons for government control of these transac-
tions. Consisting of both normative and positive elements, the analysis is not
restricted to questioning whether and why governments should provide for
state control of cross-border takeovers; rather, it extends to the actual mo-
tivation behind state interference. The article concludes with several policy
proposals.
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I. NATIONAL REGULATIONS ON THE CONTROL OF CROSS-BORDER
TAKEOVERS
In recent years, government interventions directed against the takeover of
domestic firms by foreign companies have become increasingly more fre-
quent. This does not appear to be linked to the financial and economic
crisis but is instead a general phenomenon. Apparently, many states see
their interests affected when a domestic firm falls into the hands of a foreign
investor. In addition, tensions have increased with the rise of Sovereign
Wealth Funds (SWFs). Even states that are rather permissive with
foreign investment ask whether freedom of investment should extend to
state-controlled entities. An increasing number of states have adopted legal
instruments with which to control cross-border takeovers. In place of an
introduction, we will provide an overview of various control mechanisms
that have been implemented in certain countries.
A. USA
In the USA, the Exon Florio Amendment of 1988 provides a mechanism with
which to control foreign investment,1 whereby the President may prohibit a
cross-border takeover if it threatens national security. The authority to
administer the Exon Florio Amendment rests with the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which is chaired by the
Secretary of the Treasury.2 The CFIUS has the competence to impose con-
ditions or modifications necessary for the protection of national security on a
takeover. For this purpose, mitigation agreements may be made that oblige
the investor to divest certain parts of the target company or to provide
for other commitments, such as continuing the supply of products of stra-
tegic importance. Since 1993, an investigation by the CFIUS has been man-
datory in a cross-border takeover if the acquirer is a state-controlled entity
(Byrd Amendment3).
Under Exon Florio, there is neither a reporting obligation on the investor
nor a limitation period on the government. However, once a review has been
initiated by the government or a notice of the transaction has been filed by
the parties, an investigation has to be completed within 30–75 days; the
President has another 15 days for the preparation of his/her decision after
a recommendation from the CFIUS. The absence of a limitation period
means that an investigation may be initiated several years after a takeover.
1 Section 721 Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended by section 5021 of the United
States Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. See Jose E. Alvarez, ‘Political
Protectionism and United States International Investment Obligations in Conflict: The
Hazards of Exon-Florio’, 30 Virginia Journal of International Law 1 (1989).
2 CFIUS was founded by President Gerald Ford in 1975. Thus, he reacted to growing concerns
within Congress regarding increasing investment flows from OPEC countries.
3 National Defense Authorisation Act of 1993.
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Despite the absence of a reporting obligation, the parties therefore have an
interest in notifying the CFIUS to have legal certainty after expiry of the
investigation deadlines.
So far, the President has imposed a prohibition based on Exon Florio in
only one case.4 In this case, it was feared that the takeover of a supplier to
Boeing might give the Chinese acquirer access to the premises of Boeing,
including access to projects of military relevance. Recently, a second case
of application was imminent when the Chinese investor Northwest Non-
Ferrous International Investment wanted to take over the ailing US mining
company Firstgold. In December 2009, the CFIUS recommended the pro-
hibition of the project because a mine of the target company was situated
within 50 miles of a naval air station and other military installations. The
investor withdrew its project so that the President did not have to make a
decision.5 However, clear cases such as these are exceptions. Regulatory
mechanisms governing investment control have strong preventative effects.
Formal prohibitions or even rumours of regulatory problems may comprom-
ise a firm’s reputation. Hence, if informal contacts uncover a negative atti-
tude from the authorities, investors will often refrain from moving forward.6
A threat to national security does not necessarily require a connection with
the arms industry; it is sufficient that the takeover affects the ability of the
country to defend itself. For example, the CFIUS investigated the transfer of
International Business Machines Corporation’s IBM’s PC business to the
Chinese firm Lenovo. Despite initial concerns regarding possible espionage,
the transaction was eventually authorized in 2005.7 The most well-known
cases go beyond a regular application of Exon Florio. The CFIUS had already
authorized the takeover of important US harbours by Dubai Ports World (DP
World) in 2006. Strong resistance arose from Congress, and DP World found
4 Decision of 1 February 1990—China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation
(CATIC). Because the takeover had already been implemented, divestiture of the merged entity
was imposed; see American Bar Association—Section of Antitrust Law, Review of Foreign
Acquisitions Under the Exon-Florio Provision (1992) 151–52.
5 See Matthew C. Sullivan, ‘Mining for Meaning: Assessing CFIUS’s Rejection of the Firstgold
Acquisition’, 4 Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist 12 (2010). It was possibly not
just the proximity to military installations, but also the presence of the highly coveted rare
earth metals in the mines in question that influenced the negative outcome; see Sullivan, ibid,
at 16.
6 See the numbers in CFIUS, Annual Report to Congress, December 2011, www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/2011%20CFIUS%20Annual%
20Report%20FINAL%20PUBLIC.pdf (visited 19 May 2012), 2. From 2008 to 2010, 313
transactions were reported to the CFIUS. And 29 notices were withdrawn during the thirty-
day review period. In 93 cases, an investigation was initiated. 13 notices were withdrawn
during the investigation. There were no presidential decisions. For earlier cases, see Edward
M. Graham and David M. Marchick, US National Security and Foreign Direct Investment
(Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2006) 57ff.
7 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006 (New York and Geneva, 2006), 242 n 38. The
details of the procedure are secret, so no reliable statements regarding potentially agreed upon
requirements can be made.
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itself constrained to reselling the US portion of the business that had been
taken over.8 A comparable situation had previously occurred in 2005, when a
takeover of the California oil company Unocal Corporation by the Chinese
company China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) failed because of
general political resistance, not because of a CFIUS recommendation. The
takeover of a domestic energy firm by a foreign state enterprise was con-
sidered a threat to national security.9
After these two affairs, Congress debated whether the Exon Florio rules
needed to be tightened. As a result, the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) was enacted. On the one hand, FINSA has
enlarged the scope of the regulation by subjecting the takeover of any ‘critical
infrastructure’ (including energy supply) or ‘critical technologies’10 to a man-
datory investigation.11 On the other hand, the condition for prohibition or
modification continues to be a threat to national security and not to ‘eco-
nomic security’, a concept that was also proposed.12 However, the number of
factors to be considered has been extended. For example, the level of
cooperation of the investor’s state with US authorities in the field of
counter-terrorism may be taken into account. Congress is also involved to
a greater extent in decision shaping. The composition of the CFIUS is
codified in FINSA, and the participation of numerous agencies aims at
strengthening the influence of non-economic considerations.13 Indeed, pro-
gress has been made regarding transparency of procedures. However,
8 See Bashar H. Malkawi, ‘The Dubai Ports World Deal and U.S. Trade and Investment Policy
in an Era of National Security’, 7 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 443 (2006). It is
worthwhile to mention that the transaction also covered all British ports. Since no political
resistance arose in the UK, the British ports today are run by DP World.
9 See Joseph Mamounas, ‘Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic Assets – The
Challenge of Maintaining National Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World’, 13
Law and Business Review of the Americas 381 (2007), at 403. Soon afterwards, Unocal was
taken over by Chevron.
10 See the definitions in section 721 of the Defense Production Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2170) (a)
(6) and (7).
11 For an overview of the new rules, see George Stephanov Georgiev, ‘The Reformed CFIUS
Regulatory Framework: Mediating Between Continued Openness to Foreign Investment and
National Security’, 25 Yale Journal on Regulation 125 (2008).
12 For tendencies to expand the prohibition conditions, see Matthew R. Byrne, ‘Protecting
National Security and Promoting Foreign Investment: Maintaining the Exon-Florio
Balance’, 67 Ohio State Law Journal 849 (2006), at 904; Gaurav Sud, ‘From Fretting
Takeovers to Vetting CFIUS: Finding a Balance in U.S. Policy Regarding Foreign
Acquisitions of Domestic Assets’, 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1303 (2006),
at 1327–28.
13 Details can be found in Department of the Treasury, Guidance concerning the National
Security Review Conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the USA, 73
Federal Register 74567 of 8 December 2008. Cf the annual reports of the CFIUS, www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-reports.aspx (visited
19 May 2012).
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according to some observers, the uncertainty of the outcome has not been
reduced to a satisfactory level.14
It has to be mentioned that rules for specific sectors exist outside of Exon
Florio. Foreign airlines are not permitted to acquire more than 25% of do-
mestic carriers. Other restrictions exist in the field of maritime transport,
media, telecommunications, banking, fisheries, and nuclear power.15 Some
US states provide restrictions in the insurance sector and in the purchase of
real estate.16
B. Canada
The Investment Canada Act17 subjects non-nationals to a notification obliga-
tion if they intend to acquire control of a Canadian firm and if the invest-
ment exceeds a certain threshold.18 The Minister of Industry (for takeovers
in the cultural industry, the Minister of Canadian Heritage) has to authorize
such an acquisition. The procedure should not exceed 45 days. The minister
will authorize the transaction if it creates a ‘net benefit’ for Canada.
Numerous criteria are taken into consideration, such as the impact on em-
ployment, the participation of Canadians, the recourse to Canadian input,
the effects on innovation and the effects on competition and compatibility
with Canadian industrial, economic, and cultural politics. Often, the investor
has to make commitments regarding employment, investment volume, and
research and development in Canada; the investor may also have to guaran-
tee a certain participation of Canadians in the management of the target
company and the maintenance of the company domicile in Canada.19
In 2009, the existing rules were partially relaxed and tightened. The
threshold for investors from WTO countries was increased; at the end of a
transitional period stretching over several years, it will amount to one billion
14 See Warren G. Lavey, ‘New Regulations for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States – Disclosure of Cyber Security Plans and Dealings with Sanctioned Countries
Remain Uncertain’, 10 Business Law International 253 (2009): ‘The new regulations achieve
the stated objective of greater clarity in several important areas. In spite of this progress,
however, the new regulations still leave much room for uncertainty and opaqueness in
areas such as the information requests for cyber security plans and dealings with sanctioned
countries.’
15 See World Trade Organization (WTO)—Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review
United States, Document WT/TPR/S/235 of 25 August 2010, Box III.3 behind n 177.
16 Ibid, n 177.
17 The full name is ‘An Act Respecting Investment in Canada’, www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/
eng/lk51018.html (visited 19 May 2012).
18 The threshold varies annually. In 2010, the value was about 300 million Canadian dollars for
investors from WTO members. For investors from non-WTO members (such as the Russian
Federation), the threshold amounts to 5 million Canadian dollars in cases of direct acquisi-
tion, and 50 million Canadian dollars for indirect acquisitions. The 5- and 50-million-dollar
thresholds apply to investors from WTO countries if the target company belongs to the
cultural industry.
19 Catherine Pawluch, Kevin Wright and Jonathan Gilhen, ‘Canada Enacts Significant Changes
to its Foreign Investment Laws’, 2 The CPI Antitrust Journal (2010) at 4.
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Canadian dollars. On the other hand, the government may interfere regard-
less of thresholds and of the acquisition of control if there is a threat to
national security. In these cases, an explanatory statement (which is neces-
sary when a takeover is prohibited in the absence of a net benefit) is dis-
pensable. It has to be noted that in 2007, special guidelines were adopted for
takeovers by foreign state-owned investors.20 The general rules apply, but
special consideration is bestowed upon the corporate governance and report-
ing practices of the investor.
So far, two transactions have been prohibited under the Investment Canada
Act. The takeover of the technology company MacDonald, Dettwiler and
Associates (MDA) by the US-American competitor Alliant Techsystems was
prohibited in 2008. The authorities could not exclude the risk that, after
the takeover, the Canadian government’s access to the space and satellite
technology in question would no longer be guaranteed.21 The second pro-
hibition concerned the project of the Australian company BHP Billiton to
take over the fertilizer manufacturer Potash. In 2010, the Minister of
Industry announced that, without substantial changes, he would not author-
ize the deal. After that, BHP Billiton withdrew its bid.22
Moreover, special legal rules in Canada limit or exclude foreign investment
in banking, media, telecommunications, airlines, and railroads.
C. France
French law regarding inbound FDI was fundamentally changed in 2005.23
There are filing and authorization requirements for the takeover of domestic
firms in certain sectors, such as encryption technology, the arms industry,
private security systems, and dual-use products. The Minister for Economic
Affairs has the power to prohibit takeovers if they are determined to be
against national interests. As this power refers only to the economic sectors
mentioned, the scope of the written rules is rather narrow. However, the
government exerts a de facto control of a general nature. National champions
are promoted, and a philosophy of ‘economic patriotism’ has been de-
veloped.24 In many cases, the government has informally thwarted the
20 ‘Guidelines - Investment by state-owned enterprises - Net benefit assessment’, www.ic.gc.ca/
eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk00064.html#state-owned (visited 19 May 2012).
21 See Pawluch, Wright and Gilhen, above n 19.
22 See New York Times, 16 November 2010, B 8.
23 De´cret n 2005-1739 du 30 de´cembre 2005 re´glementant les relations financie`res avec
l’e´tranger et portant application de l’article L151-3 du code mone´taire et financier, JORF
of 31 December 2005.
24 Bernard Carayon, Intelligence e´conomique, compe´titivite´ et cohe´sion sociale, Paris 2003, p 11 and
passim, www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/034000484/index.shtml (visited 19
May 2012). Id., Patriotisme e´conomique: De la guerre a` la paix e´conomique (Monaco: Editions du
Rocher, 2006). ‘Economic Patriotism’ is a comprehensive approach to the defence of national
economic interests. One aspect of the concept is devoted to the protection of domestic busi-
ness enterprises against foreign takeovers. See Andreas Heinemann, ’O¨konomischer
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takeover of domestic firms by foreign investors and helped to find national
solutions. For example, in 2004, the takeover of Aventis by the Swiss com-
pany Novartis was prevented, and, instead, a merger of Aventis with the
French company Sanofi was encouraged. Likewise, in 2004, the takeover
of Alstom by the German company Siemens was blocked, and a solution
with the French conglomerate Bouygues was found. In 2005, rumours
regarding the acquisition of Danone by PepsiCo triggered strong governmental
resistance. In the years 2006–08, the takeover of Suez by the Italian company
ENEL was hindered, and a merger of Suez with Gaz de France (GDF) was
favoured instead (2006–08). France and Luxembourg each resisted the take-
over of Arcelor by Mittal Steel. The merger became effective only after the
investor made commitments to the maintenance of headquarters and of pro-
duction sites. Other examples of government intervention into the takeover
of domestic firms could be given.
D. China
Economic policy in China relies heavily on industrial policy. Big firms are
forged that are expected to be competitive in world markets. For inbound
FDI, the ‘Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries’
must be consulted.25 Long lists enumerate activities in which foreign invest-
ment is encouraged, restricted, or prohibited. Applications for authorization
have to be filed with the Ministry of Trade (MOFCOM). For many sectors,
there are special rules regarding investment requirements. Foreign banks are
restricted in their activities, and domestic banks are treated as foreign banks
if foreigners hold a total share of 25% or more.26 In the field of life insur-
ance, foreign insurers may hold a maximum share of 50%; there are no
restrictions for other insurance activities.27 Foreign investors may not acquire
shares in media. Regarding general industrial companies, authorizations are
practiced restrictively, and a share of less than 50% is usually granted.
Emphasis is placed on the inflow of technology.28
Patriotismus’ in Zeiten regionaler und internationaler Integration (Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck,
2011).
25 This catalogue was updated in December 2007; see the Decree No 57 of the State
Development and Reform Commission of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s
Republic of China, www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=87372 (visited
19 May 2012). See also the ‘Regulations for Merger with and Acquisition of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors’, effective on 8 September 2006, available at www.yfao
.gov.cn/Enshow2.aspx?id=172 (visited 19 May 2012).
26 WTO, Trade Policy Review - Report by the Secretariat, China, WT/TPR/S/199, 16 April
2008, Part IV, n 149ff.
27 Ibid, n 187.
28 See the overview in OECD, Investment Policy Reviews - China, Open Policies Towards Mergers
and Acquisitions (Paris: OECD, 2006). MOFCOM provides an internet portal with informa-
tion for foreign investors; see www.fdi.gov.cn/index.htm (visited 19 May 2012).
Control of Cross-Border M&A 849
 at U
niversitaet Zuerich on Septem
ber 20, 2012
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Article 31 of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law requires the Anti-Monopoly
Authority to apply national security rules when examining a merger. Hence,
investment control is built into competition law, an area that is already
criticized as being used for purposes of investment control. A prominent
example is the Coca Cola case. In 2009, MOFCOM prohibited the takeover
of the Chinese juice producer China Huiyuan Juice Group by Coca Cola, the
first prohibition under the new Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law of 2007, by
pointing to the anticompetitive effects of the merger.29 Since the official
reasoning of the Coca Cola prohibition decision is very short, it is difficult
to assess allegations of protectionism.30 In other cases, MOFCOM has
issued merger approvals, although usually only with conditions.31
E. Other countries
Special control of inbound FDI exists in many other countries. For example,
in 2009, Germany introduced a general control mechanism for takeovers by
investors outside of the EU and EFTA.32 The Minister of Economy may
prohibit such a takeover if it jeopardizes public policy or the public security
of the country. Although investors are not under any reporting requirement
and a three-month limitation period runs from the signing of the contract or
from the publication of the decision to submit a public offer, the parties have
an incentive to make contact with the competent ministry to assure legal
certainty. According to reports, the ministry uses this mechanism to obtain
guarantees from the acquirer with respect to the investment, such as its
duration.33
It is worth noting that the openness of a country to takeovers from abroad
does not necessarily depend on the absence or the existence of formal in-
vestment control mechanisms. For example, British law gives the government
the competence to block certain takeovers, whereas Switzerland does not
have such rules. Nevertheless, in both countries, there is great openness to
inbound FDIs, such as through M&As. On the other hand, there are coun-
tries where foreign takeovers are less welcome, such as Japan, where inbound
FDI is the lowest in the OECD. This is not so much due to formal invest-
ment control mechanisms, although the Ministers of Finance and Industry
29 German translation of the decision available at Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 2009,
408.
30 See, for example, the analysis of Britton Davis, ‘China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: Protectionism
or a Great Leap Forward?’, 33 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
305 (2010).
31 See Dan Wei, ‘China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and its Merger Enforcement: Convergence and
Flexibility’, 14 Journal of International Economic Law 807 (2011).
32 Foreign Trade and Payments Act as amended by the law enacted on 18 April 2009 (Federal
Law Gazette I 770).
33 See Hans-Joachim Priess and Ba¨rbel Sachs, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 7 October
2009, 23.
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may ban an acquisition if it constitutes a threat to national security.34
However, this mechanism has been used only once, in 2008, when the gov-
ernment prevented the British hedge fund The Children’s Investment Fund
(TCI) from increasing its share in the Japanese energy supplier J-Power
from 9.9% to 20%.35 The main reason for the scarcity of foreign takeovers
in Japan is based on factual circumstances, such as the web of cross share-
holdings within the Japanese economy.36 In Russia, the obstacles to takeovers
from abroad consist of both legal mechanisms and factual circumstances.
The 2008 Strategic Sectors Law provides for comprehensive governmental
control in 42 economic sectors, and the required administrative proceedings
for a foreign takeover are opaque by modern standards.37
F. Insights
This brief survey shows that many countries have adopted formal mechan-
isms to control takeovers from abroad. Some are restricted to specific sectors
considered to be of strategic importance, while others apply to all sectors
alike. Some address all foreign investors, while others differentiate between
investors from either WTO members or non-members or EU/EFTA or
non-EU/EFTA member states. Control mechanisms do not only exist in
states that have a tradition of heavy-handed interference in the economy
and that try to promote national champions. In recent years, many countries
have either created regulations or amended existing regulations to permit
control of foreign takeovers. This experience has shown that these rules
have a strong preventative effect. While there are only sporadic formal pro-
hibitions, there were a high number of takeover projects that were aban-
doned after concerns were expressed by public authorities.
We must also mention general corporate and capital market laws. The
rules governing the transferability of shares, the duties of target companies
in the case of a hostile takeover (for example, the legality of creating ‘poison
pills’), or mandatory offers in the acquisition of control over another com-
pany are of great importance for the outcome of a takeover, whether foreign
34 See Article 27 (5) of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA).
35 Order to TCI to Discontinue Investment in J-Power based on FEFTA, 13 May 2008, www
.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/report/080513-1.pdfwww.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/report/080513-
1.pdf (visited 19 May 2012). See as well Recommendation to TCI, 16 April 2008, www
.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/report/080416-2.pdfwww.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/report/080416-
2.pdf (visited 19 May 2012). The prohibition was in part based on the past practices of the
investor.
36 For details, see OECD, ‘Strengthening the Integration of Japan in the World Economy to
Benefit More Fully From Globalisation’, Paris: OECD, Economics Department Working
Paper No 526, 2006, 12ff.
37 Regarding the investment climate in Russia and the new law of 2008, including the work of
the Commission for Foreign Investment Control, see William E. Pomeranz, ‘Russian
Protectionism and the Strategic Sectors Law’, 25 American University International Law
Review 213 (2010).
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or domestic. Thus, the legislature may put domestic shareholders in a pos-
ition to defend themselves against a takeover from abroad. If these tools are
granted generously, takeover attempts will often fail.38 These and other as-
pects of corporate and capital market law are too complex to be included in
this article.39 Another instrument with which a state can use to defend a
domestic company against unsolicited takeovers is the issuing of ‘golden
shares’. Often in the hand of the state, they give their owner a power dis-
proportionate to the actual value of the share. Thus, the holder of golden
shares can outvote other shareholders or at least block important decisions of
the company in question.40
II. THE REQUIREMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
A. Starting point
Are states allowed to prevent foreign investors from taking over domestic
companies? The principle of sovereignty gives states ample leeway in answer-
ing this question. International economic law focuses on the question of the
extent to which cross-border investments are protected once they have been
made (for example, against expropriation). However, customary interna-
tional law does not grant rights to investors to be admitted with their invest-
ment in another country.41
B. Bilateral treaties
The freedom of states may be restricted by international treaties, such
as bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Worldwide, there are 2807 BITs.
38 Cf the quote of the (then) European Commissioner for the Internal Market regarding the
experience with the EU Takeover Directive (2004/25/EC) of 2004 which was supposed to
restrict the possibilities of companies to defend themselves against bidders: ‘Too many
Member States are reluctant to lift existing barriers, and some are even giving companies
yet more power to thwart bids. The protectionist attitude of a few seems to have had a
knock-on effect on others. If this trend continues, then there is a real risk that companies
launching a takeover bid will face more barriers, not fewer. That goes completely against the
whole idea of the Directive’ (European Commission, Press Release IP/07/251 of 27 February
2007).
39 For an analysis, see Federico M. Mucciarelli, Societa` per azioni e offerta pubblica d’acquisto. Le
difese successive contro offerte pubbliche d’acquisto di azioni quotate (Milan: Giuffre` Editore,
2004).
40 In the EU, golden shares have been declared as widely illegal under the free movement of
capital rules, see below II.D.2.
41 For an overview of international investment law, see Daniel D. Bradlow and Alfred Escher
(eds), Legal Aspects of Foreign Direct Investment (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law
International, 1999); Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International
Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Thomas Pollan, Legal Framework
for the Admission of FDI (Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2006); M. Sornarajah, The
International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010).
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The list of contracting parties is headed by Germany (136), China (127),
and Switzerland (118).42 Whereas the scope of these treaties was initially
restricted to investments already made in the past, promoting and admitting
future investments are becoming increasingly included.43 An advantage of a
BIT for an investor compared with other fields of public international law
concerns dispute settlement; while dispute settlement usually only occurs
between states in international treaties, many BITs allow for investor-state
disputes.
BITs, however, do not typically include free movement rules. Frequently,
‘best efforts’ clauses are preferred over binding admission commitments, or a
reservation of statutory powers is added subordinating the investment to the
entirety of domestic legislation.44 More recent types of BITs extend the
principles of national treatment and most favoured nation (MFN) to the
pre-entry phase of the investment, thus giving foreign investors the right to
have their investments treated on an equal footing with nationals or with
investors from third states privileged by a treaty.45 This extension consider-
ably improves the legal position of an investor. However, countries under-
taking such far-reaching commitments regularly include reservations and
exemptions with respect to certain sectors.46 Exceptions for the protection
of national security are added and they may be self-judging, i.e., exempted
from an examination within a dispute settlement procedure.47 Hence, host
states keep control over the admission of foreign investment including the
power to protect strategic sectors and to pursue industrial policy.
C. Multilateral treaties
There are some multilateral treaties and institutions in the investment field,
such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), whose
42 See the numbers in UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011 (New York and Geneva, 2011),
100, 213–15. For an analysis of the general issues raised by BITs, see Jose E. Alvarez, ‘A Bit
on Custom’, 42 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 17 (2009).
43 See European Commission, Communication - Towards a comprehensive European international
investment policy, COM(2010) 343 final of 7 July 2010, 5.
44 See, for example, Article 2 (1) of the German Model Treaty: ‘Each Contracting State shall in
its territory promote as far as possible investments by investors of the other Contracting State
and admit such investments in accordance with its legislation’.
45 See Articles 3 and 4 of the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at www.state.gov/
documents/organization/117601.pdf (visited 19 May 2012). For recent trends in the EU see
Julien Chaisse, ‘Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment –
How Will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging Global Regime?’, 15
Journal of International Economic Law 51 (2012), 69–73.
46 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking (New York
and Geneva 2007), 80ff, 142.
47 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010 (New York and Geneva, 2010), 87. But see William
J. Moon, ‘Essential Security Interests in International Investment Agreements’, 15 Journal of
International Economic Law (forthcoming), who limits the host state’s margin of appreciation
in order to guarantee investors sufficient predictability.
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mandate is to promote FDI by insuring investors against political risk. Also a
part of the World Bank Group is the International Center for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which provides a forum for the settlement
of disputes between host countries and investors.48 Other relevant organiza-
tions are OECD and WTO whose investment-related aspects shall be
sketched in the following.
1. OECD
Instruments adopted within the OECD contain obligations with a direct link
to our subject, namely the admission of inbound FDI. The texts in question
are the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and the Code of Current
Invisible Operations, both adopted in 1961. The codes are not treaties but are
instead texts whose binding effect is based on their quality as a resolution of
the OECD Council. OECD member countries commit themselves to grad-
ually dismantling restrictions on the movement of capital and services. A
standstill clause prevents member countries from adopting new restrictions.49
The OECD codes are the only multilateral instruments with a binding
effect aimed at the liberalization of FDI. However, the consequences are
limited because these texts only bind OECD members. Apart from that,
the liberalization commitments are narrowly construed. For example,
‘golden shares’ are not considered restrictions in the sense of the codes.50
Lists of reservations exist, which allow every state to fine-tune and limit its
commitments. As for enforcement, the OECD does not have a dispute settle-
ment mechanism; it relies instead on peer review.
2. WTO
WTO law contains investment-related provisions. The Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) addresses investment insofar
as it affects trade. Local content requirements and trade-balancing provisions
are prohibited. However, TRIMs is not concerned with the liberalization of
cross-border investment.51 More relevant for our context is the General
48 See Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
49 Moreover, OECD has adopted the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises aiming at the coordination of FDI-related measures of OECD member states. The
first version dates back to 1976, the most recent one has been adopted in 2011. The text is a
(non-binding) code of conduct. With respect to the National Treatment commitments, an
‘OECD National Treatment Instrument’ has been adopted by which compliance of the
Member States can be examined. However, contrary to the Code of Liberalisation of Capital
Movements, National Treatment in the sense of the Declaration refers only to the
post-establishment phase, so the instrument is not relevant to the subject of takeover control.
50 See OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and Current Invisible Operations -
A User’s Guide, 2007, 23-24, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/23/38072327.pdf (visited 19 May
2012).
51 The proposal of the USA and Japan to include more general commitments did not succeed;
see John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System - A History of the Uruguay Round
(Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1995) 138ff, 256ff, 308ff. Therefore, the passage in
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Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Cross-border services may require
a commercial presence in the territory of another WTO member
(’Mode 3’).52 If WTO members undertake commitments in this sense,
rights to market access arise. However, in practice, these commitments do
not reach very far. Reservations may be added, including caps on the par-
ticipation of foreign investors in domestic enterprises and excluding a com-
plete takeover. Moreover, exceptions for the protection of national security
apply. Hence, WTO law does not contain a general investment regime. The
investment topic was included in the list of the ‘new issues’ at the Singapore
Ministerial Conference (1996) but was removed after the failed Cancu´n
Ministerial (2003).53
3. The multilateral agreement on investment
Hence, plans for an investment agreement within the WTO have shared the
same outcome as that of the initiative for a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI), which has been under negotiation within the OECD
since 1995.54 The draft text of this agreement extended the principles of
national treatment and MFN to the pre-entry phase, i.e., the admission of
investment. Investors from the contracting parties would have obtained the
right to make investments under the same conditions as domestic investors
or as investors from third states privileged by a treaty. Although exceptions
existed regarding the legality of state monopolies, golden shares in cases of
privatization, or the protection of national security, the MAI would have
established clear principles for the admission of cross-border takeovers.
However, MAI negotiations failed in 1998. Opponents criticized the loss
of national sovereignty in the field of public services and the failure to
answer the question of a ‘cultural exception’.55
4. Results
This overview shows that international economic law does not provide for
important restrictions on states regarding the control of takeovers from
abroad.56 Exceptions are more recent BITs that refer to national treatment
and MFN regarding the admission of investments. More ambitious projects
the preamble expressing the desire ‘to facilitate investment across international frontiers’ is
not implemented in the agreement.
52 Article I (2) c) GATS.
53 Due to the decision of 1 August 2004, the WTO General Council has eliminated the topic
‘Investment and Trade’ from the work programme of the Doha Development Round, see
WTO, WT/L/579, no. 1 g). The same fate befell two other ‘Singapore issues’, namely com-
petition law and public procurement.
54 For the negotiating history see the documentation at www1.oecd.org/daf/mai (visited 19 May
2012).
55 See UNCTAD, Lessons from the MAI, 1999.
56 Cf UNCTAD, Admission and Establishment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International
Investment Agreements, 2002, 37ff, where the remaining leeway is broken down to six
options.
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such as MAI or the inclusion of the investment topic in the WTO systems
have not been successful. The existence of the ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ of BITs is
due in no small part to the absence of a comprehensive multilateral invest-
ment treaty of universal scope.
D. Regional Integration Agreements: The example of the EU
Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) often contain investment chapters.
This is, for example, the case with the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) that contains detailed rules on investment between
NAFTA member states.57 The principles of National Treatment and MFN
are applied to the admission of investment.58 Hence, investors from other
NAFTA member states have the right to make investments under the same
conditions as nationals (or, respectively, as citizens from third countries
privileged by an agreement), including the takeover of domestic businesses.
It is expressly stated that no party may impose a requirement according to
which a minimum level of equity in a domestic enterprise has to be held by
domestic investors.59 However, NAFTA member states may enforce restric-
tions on foreign investment in certain sectors or block such investment com-
pletely. Intensive use has been made of this possibility, and the lists of
exceptions fill more than one hundred pages.60 A similar result can be
found in MERCOSUR. Whereas the principles of national treatment and
MFN apply to the pre-entry phase, many exceptions exist.61
1. The EU Free Movement Rules
An example of far-reaching investment provisions is the European Union.
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contains
chapters on free establishment and on the free movement of capital that not
only prohibit discrimination but also provide for a general liberalization in
this field. The number of exceptions is rather restricted.62 The free
movement rules restrict the margin within which Member States can inter-
fere with cross-border takeovers. It has to be emphasized that, in 1993,
European law extended the free movement of capital rules to investments
57 See NAFTA Chapter 11 on Investment and Seymour J. Rubin and Dean C. Alexander (eds),
Nafta and Investment (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 1995).
58 Article 1102 section 1 NAFTA: ‘Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treat-
ment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and
sale or other disposition of investments.’ Regards MFN, see Article 1103 NAFTA.
59 Article 1102 section 4 (a) NAFTA.
60 See Article 1108 NAFTA with reference to the schedules annexed.
61 UNCTAD, Investment Provisions in Economic Integration Agreements, 2006, p 22.
62 The EU itself is involved in a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties associated with the
investment field. See an overview in European Commission, Provisions on Capital Movements
in Multilateral & Bilateral Agreements of the European Union with Third Parties, 2007, http://ec
.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/docs/multi-bilateral-agreements_en.pdf (visited 19 May
2012).
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from countries that are not members of the EU or EFTA. Hence, contrary to
other RIAs, investors from any country in the world may invoke EU law to
be admitted with their investment in an EU member state. The erga omnes
effect is not conditioned on reciprocity, i.e., even investors from states that
put obstacles in the way of foreign investors benefit from the EU rules on the
free movement of capital.63 However, with respect to these third-party coun-
tries, the Treaty provides for more exceptions so that, as a result, the EU
Member States may be less open to third countries than to other Member
States.64
2. EU Case Law
The European Court of Justice has applied the free movement rules in nu-
merous cases. There are two sets of cases with particular importance to our
discussion. In the first group, the Court has established strict principles for
national investment control procedures. Often, national procedures are
declared illegal because they lack transparency. If authorities are granted
broad powers, there is a particular danger that foreigners may be discrimi-
nated against.65 The decision on the authorization of a certain investment
must be based on objective criteria that are known to the investors in ad-
vance. The Court will examine whether the legislative goal can be obtained
by less restrictive measures, for example, by a system of declarations ex post
facto instead of a prior authorization scheme.66
The second set of cases concerns ‘golden shares’. The European
Commission has brought a series of infringement proceedings against EU
Member States granting certain shareholders, mostly public authorities, dis-
proportionate power in a corporation and thus violating the principle of ‘one
share one vote’. The Court has consistently held that such special rights may
prevent foreign investors from investing capital in the undertaking con-
cerned.67 The infringement may be justified, for example, if it aims to
grant Member States ‘a degree of influence within undertakings that were
initially public and subsequently privatised, where those undertakings are
63 For details regarding the background of this very open system, see Steffen Hindelang, The
Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment – The Scope of Protection in EU Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
64 Another restriction follows from the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Because
there is an overlapping of the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment in
the field of FDI, the Court prefers the application of the latter as lex specialis. However, the
freedom of establishment only applies to EU citizens. One should think that in the case of
investors from third countries, the rules regarding the free movement of capital would apply
again (since the freedom of establishment does not apply to citizens from third countries), but
the ECJ bars this so that there is no legal protection of FDI from third countries; see ECJ,
Case C-492/04 Lasertec (2007) ECR I-3775, para 20ff. This case law is not convincing
against the backdrop of the erga omnes effect of the European free movement of capital rules.
65 ECJ, Case C-567/07 Woningstichting Sint Servatius (2009) ECR I-9021, para 33ff.
66 ECJ, Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal (2002) ECR I-4731, para 50.
67 See, for example, ECJ, Case C-483/99 Commission v France (2002) ECR I-4781, para 41.
Control of Cross-Border M&A 857
 at U
niversitaet Zuerich on Septem
ber 20, 2012
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
active in fields involving the provision of services in the public interest or
strategic services’.68 However, the measure has to respect the principle of
proportionality, i.e., it must be suitable for securing the pursued objective
and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.69 In most cases, state
prerogatives did not meet these conditions and were declared illegal. The
only exception is when the Court accepted the Belgian investment control
system for its energy infrastructure. According to this system, the competent
Minister has the right to oppose any transfer of strategic assets (including
energy supply networks) if he/she considers that it adversely affects the na-
tional interest in the energy sector. However, the country renounced a
system of prior approval, and the authorities have to adhere to strict time
limits. The Court held that the measures taken were necessary to guarantee
energy supplies in the event of a crisis.70
The case law shows that the standards for justification are difficult to
meet.71 This is also true for national rules directed against takeovers by
foreign state investors. One could take the position that the goal of privatiza-
tion should not be frustrated by the fact that foreign state-owned investors
can take over shares of privatized enterprises. The Court has not accepted
this argument; rather, it has simply held the view that the rules regarding the
free movement of capital do not distinguish between private and public
undertakings, whether dominant or not.72 In this view, Member States are
not even allowed to take measures that are specifically directed against take-
overs by foreign state-owned entities. Hence, privatization may be rolled
back by cross-border nationalization with the result that the firm in question
no longer belongs to its home country but to another state.73
In summary, it can be said that national investment control instruments
are not illegal per se under EU law but that the requirements for their jus-
tification are strict. States have to specify clear goals for the measures in
question. These goals must be compatible with the Treaty; for example,
they have to be justified by public policy or public security (Art 65 (1) lit.
b TFEU) or by other mandatory requirements of public interest. The Treaty
contains an exception for the defence industry (Art 346 TFEU). However, a
general interest of a state in ‘national champions’ is not a legitimate goal, nor
does the Court accept the argument that the existence of privatized enter-
prises subject to golden shares is better than renouncing on privatization
altogether. An EU Member State has to decide whether it wants to keep a
majority share in a certain enterprise. If it renounces on a majority stake, the
68 ECJ, Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal (2002) ECR I-4731, para 47.
69 Ibid, at para 49.
70 ECJ, Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium (2002) ECR I-4809, para 46ff.
71 See, for example, ECJ, Case C-463/00 Commission v Spain (2003) ECR I-4581, para 78.
72 ECJ, Case C-174/04 Commission v Italy (2005) ECR I-4933, para 32.
73 Confirmed by ECJ, Case C-274/06 Commission v Spain (2008) ECR I-26*, para 43ff.
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scope of measures aimed at the maintenance of state control is very
restricted.
3. Consequences for National Investment Control Schemes
Against this backdrop, it appears doubtful that the control mechanisms in
France and Germany74 are compatible with the requirements of EU law.
Regarding the scheme adopted in Germany, it does not seem convincing
as to why the general supervision of all sectors and of all firms regardless
of their size should be necessary to defend public policy goals. Moreover, it
remains unclear under which conditions the takeover of a domestic firm will
be prohibited. It does not appear sufficient to simply point to grounds of
‘public policy or security’ of the country without precisely specifying what is
meant by that.75 There is a danger that the competent ministry will use the
law as leverage to obtain modifications of certain transactions. Similar criti-
cism may be levelled against the French model. Even if the French legislation
is restricted to certain sectors, the criteria by which the government may
block or modify certain transactions are not sufficiently clear. It remains to
be seen whether the European Court of Justice will accept national interven-
tions based on such broadly defined rules.
4. EU merger control
After the European Commission has authorized a merger under the EU
Merger Regulation,76 the ability of Member States to interfere with that
merger project is restricted. They may only take measures ‘to protect legit-
imate interests other than those taken into consideration by this Regulation
and compatible with the general principles and other provisions of
Community law. Public security, plurality of the media and prudential
rules shall be regarded as legitimate interests within the meaning of the
first subparagraph’.77 This of course also applies to mergers in which a for-
eign investor takes over a domestic enterprise. This restriction of national
sovereignty was relevant in the Endesa case. In that case, the European
Commission had authorized the takeover of the Spanish energy provider
Endesa by the German supplier E.ON.78 The Spanish regulatory authority
imposed drastic restrictions, such as the duty to dispose of important assets.
74 See I.C and I.E above.
75 Section 7 (2) n 6 of the German Foreign Trade and Payments Act (see above n 32) adds that
a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is required that affects one of the fundamental inter-
ests of society. However, this excerpt from ECJ case law does not specify the conditions
necessary for an intervention.
76 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations between
Undertakings, 20 January 2004, OJ L 24/1.
77 Article 21 (4) Merger Regulation. Any other interest (not mentioned in the main text) has to
be notified to and recognized by the Commission.
78 European Commission, 25 April 2006, E.ON/Endesa, COMP/M.4110.
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The European Court of Justice held that Spain had violated Art 21 (4) of the
Merger Regulation.79
Thus, European merger control may be an obstacle to national
anti-takeover measures, but only if the EU Merger Regulation is applicable.
According to the ‘two-thirds rule’, this is not the case (although the turnover
threshold values are met) if each of the undertakings concerned achieves
more than two-thirds of its turnover within one and the same Member
State.80 Hence, in these cases, Member States are not influenced by the
precedence of a European Commission decision. As a result, EU merger
control has only a haphazard impact on the legality of national investment
control.
III. THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF FDI AND TAKEOVER CONTROL
REGULATIONS
So far, the legal prerequisites that restrict the ability of states to interfere with
cross-border takeovers have been discussed.81 We now ask the question of
whether states are well advised in subjecting the takeover of domestic firms
by foreign investors to special control. To answer this question, the economic
background of FDI and takeover control has to be explored. First, we will
contrast the economic goals of takeover operations with the goals of the state
control of inbound FDI. Then, on this basis, the most important aspects of
takeover control will be discussed.
A. The Economics of FDI
In the world of international capital flows, a basic distinction is made be-
tween credit transactions, portfolio investments and foreign direct invest-
ments (FDIs). Whereas a credit provides loan capital without equity
participation, a portfolio investment includes the acquisition of shares. If
shares give control over an enterprise in another state, the transaction is
categorized as a FDI. On the international level, an operative rule for the
distinction between a portfolio investment and a FDI has been adopted:
namely, a FDI starts from 10% of the shares (or the voting power) in an-
other company.82 In the takeover context, which is at the heart of our sub-
ject, participation rates are normally higher, often involving the acquisition of
a majority stake in the target company.
79 ECJ, Case C-196/07 Commission v Spain (2008) ECR I-41*.
80 See Article 1 (2) and (3) Merger Regulation.
81 The rules of international economic law have been given priority. In addition, it would be
necessary to analyse national constitutional law governing state interference with business
restructuring. This would require a separate analysis for every single country, a task that
cannot be accomplished here.
82 International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Manual, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.,
2005), n 359ff.
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At the micro-economic level, a FDI has several potential advantages for
the investor. The acquisition may permit better access to raw materials
(supply-oriented FDI), it may open up new markets (market access-oriented
FDI) or it may improve efficiency (cost savings-oriented FDI).83 Like all
factors of production, capital is scarce. The possible uses of capital compete
with one another. If the capital markets are successful, capital is directed to
the most beneficial use, and the origin of capital is not relevant. Both do-
mestic and foreign capital contribute to the economic progress alike. This
holds true for all forms of capital injection.84 On the other hand, FDI may
cause damages which often are not reflected sufficiently in economic
models.85 Consequently, there is generally a positive view of FDI today,
which is conditioned on certain prerequisites, for example the existence of
a transparent, environment-friendly, and effective legal system which favours
and protects competition on the merits. Under these conditions, not only the
investor or his country of origin, but also the country of destination will take
advantage, regardless of whether it is developed or developing.86 Whereas in
the 1970s, in the time of the ‘New International Economic Order’, FDIs in
developing countries were assessed critically, most developing countries
today try to create a favourable investment climate to attract FDIs while
providing for an adequate public policy framework.87
B. The normative rationale behind the control of FDI
1. Starting point
If, as a matter of principle, the inflow of capital into a country is a good
thing, why should states prevent foreign investors from buying domestic
firms? What are possible disadvantages for the country of the firm taken
over? In the first place, there may be the fear that the integrated company
might cut back on jobs or shift them to another country. R&D departments
83 Cf the Ownership, Location and Internalization (OLI) Paradigm of John H. Dunning, ‘Trade,
Location of Economic Activity, and the Multinational Enterprise: A Search for an Eclectic
Approach’, in Bertil Ohlin, Per-Ove Hesselborn and Per Magnus Wijkman (eds), The
International Allocation of Economic Activity (London: Macmillan, 1977) 395ff.
84 Sometimes, a political preference for ‘greenfield investment’ over M&A is expressed, i.e., the
foundation of a new firm or the creation of additional production capacities instead of the
takeover of existing capacities. However, the utility of such a preference is not corroborated by
economic theory.
85 See Theodore H. Moran, ‘Enhancing the contribution of FDI to development: a new agenda
for the corporate social responsibility community, international labour and civil society, aid
donors and multilateral financial institutions’, 20 (1) Transnational Corporations 69 (2011).
86 For an overall analysis see Theodore H. Moran, Foreign Direct Investment and Development –
Launching a Second Generation of Policy Research (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for
International Economics, 2011).
87 In the wake of the financial turbulence since 2007, the discussion on capital controls has
intensified again. However, its focus is on short-term capital flows, not on FDI; see, for
example, UNCTAD, Development-led globalization: Towards sustainable and inclusive development
paths – Report of the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to UNCAD XIII (2011) 55ff.
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might be transferred elsewhere, thereby reducing innovation in the home
country. Moreover, there may be the intention to defend sectors of strategic
importance, such as the energy sector, where the takeover of domestic firms
may create or reinforce energetic dependence. A sell-out of national re-
sources (including raw materials and domestic real estate) may be feared.
Other fears concern low environmental standards in the country of the in-
vestor, unfair subsidising, the risk of industrial espionage, and insufficient
protection of intellectual property. If the investor is state-controlled (e.g. in
the case of SWFs or of state-controlled enterprises), the influence of foreign
governments is cautioned against. Generally, there is a question as to
whether control over domestic enterprises should be given to entities in
whose home countries democracy, human rights, equal treatment, and
labour laws are not adequately respected.
2. The impact on employment
Some of these arguments are of an economic nature and hence must obtain
scientific backing in economics, which frankly seems to be lacking. To start
with, the impact of cross-border M&A on jobs in the target country is not
clear.88 There may be positive effects due to fresh capital. Moreover,
enhanced efficiencies and access of the company taken over to new markets
may secure domestic jobs. Fears might instead arise in the opposite direc-
tion, i.e., if domestic firms make direct investments abroad, parts of the
value chain may be transferred to the target’s country, including production
processes requiring low-skilled workers. However, governments very rarely
express concerns when domestic firms acquire other enterprises abroad.
Generally, it must be borne in mind that the employment rate in a certain
country depends on many circumstances. If employment conditions are not
favourable, there will be a loss of jobs anyway, regardless of whether domes-
tic firms are taken over by foreign investors. Instead, there seems to be a
complementary relationship between FDI and exports. Intense commercial
relations with other countries are frequently solidified by direct investment
with a positive effect on jobs. Moreover, empirical data do not corroborate
the assumption that there is a significant relationship between the number of
jobs in a given company and the nationality of the owner of that company. If
anything, those countries that attract few FDIs have greater difficulties in
guaranteeing jobs than countries that achieve significant inward FDIs.
88 See Christian Arndt and Anselm Mattes, ‘Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions of
Multinational Firms – New Firm-Level Evidence’, IAW Discussion Paper 62 (Tu¨bingen:
IAW, 2010) 18: ‘First, the average causal effect of cross-border M&A on the employment
of multinationals is insignificant, but, second, the effect of cross-border M&A on the multi-
nationals’ productivity is positive and significant’ (numerous references to economic literature
on p 3).
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3. Transfer of technology
Comparable statements can be made with respect to the technology transfer
argument. First, regarding the acquisition of technology, a fair amount of
money has to be paid. Second, technology transfer is often not one-way; the
firm taken over will also benefit from technologies developed by the acquir-
ing company. Finally, the transfer of technology may trigger general spillover
effects to the benefit of third parties, i.e., positive externalities.89 Therefore,
the technology transfer argument can only be accepted in the context of the
defence industry, where states can argue that innovation and know-how in
this sector should not fall into the wrong hands.
4. Public policy
Regarding the respect of human rights, environment protection, industrial
espionage, and the protection of intellectual property, the company taken
over continues to be subject to all rules applicable in its country.90 This
statement also applies to the media industry. Often, states ask the (rhet-
orical) question of whether they should allow the takeover of a domestic
media enterprise by an investor controlled by a state that disregards democ-
racy and human rights. The answer should be given through general rules
rather than by a case-by-case authorization mechanism. A requirement for
the acquisition of a stake in a media enterprise should be the respect of the
fundamental values of the target country. This condition blocks takeovers in
the media sector by investors controlled by states that, in their law or their
practice, do not share these values.
5. The energy sector
Frequently, energy markets are used as examples of a sector of strategic
importance that must be protected from foreign influence. In this view, do-
mestic ownership of domestic energy providers is a measure to guarantee
energy supply, whereas foreign ownership renders the country vulnerable.
However, this perspective disregards the cause of the problem, which is
that the security of the supply is not jeopardized by the fact that domestic
suppliers are owned by foreign companies but rather by the fact that energy
resources are situated abroad. This problem is better addressed by a com-
prehensive energy policy promoting diversification of energy and of supply
sources, as well as by better energy efficiency and a strengthening of efforts
89 See Anselm Mattes, ‘International M&A: Evidence on Effects of Foreign Takeovers’, IAW
Discussion Paper 60 (Tu¨bingen: IAW, 2010) 3.
90 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008 (New York and Geneva, 2008), 25. Rather, the
question should be asked as to which measures should be taken to subject multinational
enterprises to minimum standards, e.g., in the field of human rights and environmental pro-
tection, when they delve into the legal vacuums of the globalized economy, see Andreas
Heinemann, ‘Business Enterprises in Public International Law – The Case for an
International Code on Corporate Responsibility’, in Ulrich Fastenrath et al. (eds), From
Bilateralism to Community Interest – Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011) 718ff.
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to save energy. Problems of vertical integration are best dealt with by com-
petition law. The rules on merger control aim, inter alia, at preventing input
foreclosure. Applied to the energy markets, this means that the takeover of a
domestic energy supplier must not result in the exclusion of other suppliers
in that country from the energy supply by the acquiring company.
Thus, competition law may often address relevant problems in a more
precise manner than a political takeover control mechanism based on the
diffuse criterion of national interest. In the context of cross-border M&As,
the role of competition law has so far been underestimated.
6. SWFs and transparency
The system of free enterprise is based on private actors pursuing private
interests. If actors are not private, and if they pursue other goals, such as
general political goals, the system does not work as intended. If the actor is
controlled by a foreign state, further concerns arise regarding the strategic
and political agenda. The phenomenon of SWFs91 has recently attracted
special attention since these funds have grown considerably92 and because
they have increasingly been investing in stocks instead of bonds.93 Against
this backdrop, a strict control of SWFs has been demanded, such as a par-
ticipation cap of 20%.94 The International Monetary Fund has been asked to
draft guidelines governing the practices of SWFs. Consequently, representa-
tives of 26 states owning one or several SWFs agreed on the Santiago
Principles (2008)95 that contain best practices for the investment decisions
of SWFs. The text is a Code of Conduct that is not legally binding.96
91 See the definition in International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign
Wealth Funds - Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (’Santiago Principles’), October
2008, www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf (visited 19 May 2012), 27: ‘SWFs
are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general gov-
ernment. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold,
manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment
strategies which include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly estab-
lished out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds
of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.’
92 See Stephen Jen (Morgan Stanley), ‘How Big Could Sovereign Wealth Funds Be by 2015?’,
www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20070504-Fri.html#anchored3a90be-419e-
11de-a1b3-c771ef8db296 (visited 19 May 2012).
93 An overview of the most important SWFs can be found in the Santiago Principles (above
n 91), 31ff.
94 See, for example, Jeffrey Garten, ‘We need rules for sovereign funds’, Financial Times, 8
August 2007, 9. The Norwegian state fund did not acquire stakes higher than 5%; see
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008 (New York and Geneva, 2008), 35 n 40. The
threshold has been raised to 10%; see Norges Bank Investment Management, Government
Pension Fund Global – Annual Report 2009, 22.
95 See above n 91.
96 See, however, Joseph J. Norton, ‘The "Santiago Principles" for Sovereign Wealth Funds: A
Case Study on International Financial Standard-Setting Processes’, 13 Journal of
International Economic Law 645 (2010), at 656, who qualifies the Santiago Principles not
even as a code of conduct, but at best as ‘quasi-self-regulatory’.
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Of central importance is the principle according to which investment deci-
sions have to be based on economic rather than political considerations.97
Exceptions have to be explicitly laid down, and they have to be published.98
The operational managers of SWFs must be free from (direct) political
influence.99
Whereas the Santiago Principles regulate the problem from the perspective
of the SWFs, the OECD has adopted guidelines from the perspective of the
receiving countries.100 The principle of freedom to invest is defended against
protectionist tendencies. Exceptions in the interest of national security are
possible, but they are narrowly construed. The principles of transparency,
predictability, proportionality, and responsibility have to be respected. These
standards are to be examined in the usual peer reviews. In the absence of a
special enforcement mechanism, peer pressure shall ensure
implementation.101
An assessment of the SWF problem has to start from the economic ob-
servation already made that the inflow of capital is beneficial for a country,
regardless of the form or the origin of the capital.102 This general principle
also holds true for SWFs. How important they are may be illustrated by the
fact that, during the late-2000s financial crisis, firms in danger were queuing
up to obtain fresh money from these funds. This phenomenon highlights the
importance of a national economy to have sufficient capital inflow.
Moreover, there is no empirical evidence that investment decisions of
SWFs are driven by ‘bad’ motivations, i.e., to pursue the policy of the
originating country by economic means. The raisons d’eˆtre of these funds
are diverse (e.g. redistribution in favour of future generations, building-up
of pension funds, development of infrastructure, stabilization of commodity
prices, and hedging of country-specific risks103), and their investment strat-
egy seems to be profit-seeking rather than political.104 Therefore, there is no
97 Santiago Principles (above n 91), at 12: ‘A clearly defined policy purpose facilitates formu-
lation of appropriate investment strategies based on economic and financial objectives [. . .].
The pursuit of any other types of objectives should be narrowly defined and mandated
explicitly. A clearly defined policy purpose will also ensure that the operational management
of the SWF will conduct itself professionally and ensure that the SWF undertakes invest-
ments without any intention or obligation to fulfill, directly or indirectly, any geopolitical
agenda of the government.’
98 Principle 19.1.
99 Principles 9 and 16.
100 OECD, ‘Guidance on Sovereign Wealth Funds’, www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3343,en_
2649_34887_41807059_1_1_1_1,00.html (visited 19 May 2012).
101 The European Commission has endorsed the Santiago Principles and the OECD Guidance
on SWFs and has consequently renounced further legislative steps that have previously been
discussed. See European Commission, A Common European Approach to Sovereign Wealth
Funds, 27.2.2008, COM(2008) 115 final.
102 See above III.A.
103 See International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report, October 2007, 46–47,
www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2007/02/index.htm (visited 19 May 2012).
104 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008 (New York and Geneva, 2008), 25.
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good reason for adopting specific takeover control rules with respect to
SWFs.105 The general rules so far seem sufficient to counter the doubts
sometimes raised. The rules regarding merger control will prevent competi-
tion from being substantially lessened. In the regulated sectors, the special
regulatory rules apply. If the defence industry is concerned, the general res-
ervation in favour of the protection of national security arises.
On the other hand, it is true that in the case of SWFs coming from states
that do not meet minimum democratic standards, close attention to their
activities is necessary. Transparency should be substantially improved. In
many countries, financial regulation obliges investors to simply reveal their
identity. These rules have to be strengthened considerably.106 However, this
does not affect the preference that should be given to the Santiago Principles
and the OECD Guidelines over public takeover control mechanisms.
7. Reciprocity
Frequently, in the context of business takeovers, reciprocity is postulated.
In this view, the opening of domestic M&A markets should be made de-
pendent on whether the investor’s country offers the same favourable invest-
ment conditions. This standpoint is of particular relevance for China, Russia,
and the Arabic world, whose funds and enterprises act as active investors,
but who, at least partially, shield their capital markets from foreign invest-
ments.107 The postulate of reciprocity has intuitive value since it is an
application of the golden rule according to which others should be treated
the same way one wants to be treated by them.
However, the argument disregards the fact that inbound FDI increases the
capital stock in the country of destination and is therefore beneficial, inde-
pendent of reciprocity or the distinction between the private or public origin
of the capital invested. Correspondingly, the majority of economists think
that openness is positive for a national economy even if domestic investors do
not have the same market access abroad. For this very reason, in the EU, the
105 Cf the analyses of Bruce Winfield Bean, ‘Attack of the Sovereign Wealth Funds: Defending
the Republic from the Threat of Sovereign Wealth Funds?’, 18 Michigan State Journal of
International Law 65 (2009); Richard A. Epstein and Amanda M. Rose, ‘The Regulation of
Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow’, 76 University of Chicago Law Review
111 (2009); Yvonne Lee, ‘The Governance of Contemporary Sovereign Wealth Funds’, 6
Hastings Business Law Journal 197 (2009); Joel Slawotsky, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds as
Emerging Financial Superpowers: How U.S. Regulators Should Respond’, 40 Georgetown
Journal of International Law 1239 (2009).
106 See IV.A below.
107 See, for example, Garten (above n 94) with respect to SWFs: ‘Reciprocity should be
required. If western host countries are going to treat SWFs like any other market participant,
the economy of the SWF’s home country must be as open as the country in which the SWF
aspires to invest. In addition, if a sovereign fund was established because of currency ma-
nipulation in the host country that led to excess reserve creation (China), or if it is the result
of strident resource nationalism (Russia), or if it is due to monopolistic pricing practices
(Saudi Arabia), then consultations should be initiated between the two governments to
reduce these policy distortions.’
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rules regarding the free movement of capital are vested with an erga omnes
effect that is not conditioned on reciprocity.108 Moreover, closer relationships
resulting from direct investment may lead to better market access in the
country of origin, at least in the medium term.
States not willing to grant advantages unilaterally may invoke the trade
policy argument, which holds that the opening up of foreign capital markets
may be accomplished more easily if access to one’s own capital markets is
used as leverage during trade negotiations. However, restrictions on capital
inflow will cause welfare losses until a positive outcome of these negotiations
is achieved.
C. Political reasons for public takeover control
As the economic analysis has shown, there is only a very limited justification
for FDI control mechanisms. In sharp contrast to this finding stands the
growing popularity of such mechanisms, as discussed in the first part of
this article. The most plausible explanation for this discrepancy can be
found by a positive analysis on the basis of the public choice approach.109
The starting point of this analysis is the idea that politicians, and not just
economic actors, maximize personal utility by proposing and taking measures
that aim at increasing personal popularity and votes. In this view, politicians
propose the use of FDI screening instruments because they think that they
will be rewarded by voters for such initiatives. The underlying expectation is
that resentments against the ’sell-out’ of the domestic economy may be
mobilized. Apparently, the population is rather willing to accept ‘made in
China’ than ‘owned by China’.110
The experience in the USA, for example in the Dubai Ports World case,111
supports this hypothesis. The CFIUS, the competent body responsible for
resolving questions of national security, had already authorized the takeover
of major US port facilities. Pressure from Congress (including a 348 to 71
vote against the takeover in the House of Representatives) urged Dubai Ports
World to renounce the US part of the transaction. If we assume that the
CFIUS was right in rejecting a potential threat to national security, polit-
icians apparently reacted to subliminal hostility among the population against
this project and converted resentments against certain investors from abroad
into politics.112
108 See II.D.1 above.
109 See the seminal work of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent –
Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1962).
110 Cf Alasdair Keith, ‘Outsights on the Five Flows of Globalisation’, www.outsights.co.uk/li
brary/4/OutsightsOntheFiveFlowsofGlobalisation (visited 19 May 2012), 5.
111 See I.A above.
112 See Yiheng Feng, ‘ "We Wouldn’t Transfer Title to the Devil": Consequences of the
Congressional Politicization of Foreign Direct Investment on National Security Grounds’,
Control of Cross-Border M&A 867
 at U
niversitaet Zuerich on Septem
ber 20, 2012
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
A strong mobilization of voters may also be obtained through the job
argument. Since the complex economic relationships are not easily intelli-
gible, those politicians who justify protectionist measures with the goal of job
security are often rewarded. Those who refer to the welfare-enhancing effect
of investment and to the necessity of an overall balance will have more dif-
ficulty conveying this more complicated message.
Finally, lobbying plays an important role in the field of investment control.
With investment barriers, domestic firms can keep foreign competitors at a
distance. The general rule is that restrictions on free trade frequently aim
at protecting domestic firms against competitors from abroad. However,
what is good for domestic firms may not always be good for domestic
consumers.
There are different means by which to counter these mechanisms. The
classical method is the allocation of decision-making power to independent
authorities. However, this is only of limited effect if the authority’s decision is
undermined by political interference. Parliament should adopt the general
rules which—in a second step—are to be applied by the administrative
authorities under the control of the courts. A long-term instrument is
public dissemination and communication regarding the advantages and
disadvantages of international integration, with special attention to the posi-
tive and negative effects of cross-border investments. Some progress in
public awareness of the relevant causal relationships can be noted. For
example, in the USA, while the takeover of the Rockefeller Center by
Mitsubishi and of Columbia Pictures by Sony in 1989 triggered shock waves,
the public has become more accustomed to the fact that even well-known
enterprises may belong to foreign owners. However, economic crises often
lead to opposing tendencies. The insight that openness and exchange are
part of the solution, rather than the problem, is easily lost during such
periods.113
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK IN NEED OF REFORM
Summing up, general control of inbound FDIs cannot be recommended. An
exception applies to the field of national security, a term that must be
42 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 253 (2009), at 255: ‘[T]he Exon-Florio
review process is far too susceptible to outside political forces in the form of overzealous
congressional interference with CFIUS and its mission. Rather than address national security
concerns, unrestricted political interference based on political gamesmanship and economic
protectionism [. . .] can result in a chilling effect on future investment opportunities.’ For an
opposing view, see David Zaring, ‘CFIUS As a Congressional Notification Service’, 83
Southern California Law Review 81, 125 (2009), who considers parliamentary interference
an important complement to the work of the competent authorities.
113 Cf UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010 (New York and Geneva, 2010), p iii: ‘For the
recovery to remain on track, private investment is crucial for stimulating growth and em-
ployment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has a major role to play.’
868 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 15(3)
 at U
niversitaet Zuerich on Septem
ber 20, 2012
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
construed narrowly.114 The exception in favour of national security does not
justify a general takeover control over sectors declared strategically import-
ant, such as, for example, the energy or banking sectors.
A. Increasing transparency
Reforms are indicated in the field of capital market law. The analysis with
respect to SWFs shows a considerable lack of transparency. While it is true
that in many countries, an investor has to notify the competent authority
when the acquisition of another firm reaches a certain percentage, often only
the name and address of the investor has to be revealed. Disclosure rules
should be considerably enlarged. The reporting requirements in the USA or
in France could serve as an example. In these countries, starting from a
participation in the range of 5%115 or 10%,116 investors have to make
detailed reports about, for example, their goals for the next six months or
whether the acquisition of control or of an influence on the composition of
the board of directors is intended. The origin of the capital should be dis-
closed, including the distribution of debt and equity. However, these require-
ments are not sufficient. As many countries exist that lack comprehensive
public disclosure rules, an audited annual report should be required from the
investor that provides information on the overall strategy, on its corporate
governance and on the supervision details in its home country. A rating by a
recognized rating agency would strengthen the confidence in the report. The
Santiago Principles contain important directives that should be generalized
beyond the topic of SWFs. As a result, access to direct investment markets
should only be granted in exchange of more transparency.
B. Multilateral investment rules
An increase in transparency would certainly constitute an important step.
It is likewise useful to point to the general rules of competition law and to
the special rules for regulated industries that invalidate some concerns ex-
pressed in the context of cross-border M&A. However, the core problem
identified here can only be addressed by closer international cooperation.
There is considerable risk that governments use (or misuse) FDI control
114 See, for example, the EU-US Open Investment Statement, EU-MEMO/08/301, 13 May
2008, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/may/tradoc_138822.pdf (visited 19 May
2012): ‘An open investment environment is compatible with policies that address genuine
national security concerns. Measures that address national security concerns should be trans-
parent, predictable and proportionate to the national security concern identified, and pre-
cisely circumscribed so as to avoid unduly disrupting the flow of investment.’
115 Section 13 d): US Securities Exchange Act.
116 Article L233-7 VII of the French Commercial Code.
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mechanisms to exert undue influence on cross-border restructuring.117
As the analysis has shown, the numerous BITs are not equipped to counter
this risk, and the same is true for existing multilateral instruments. What is
missing is an international investment treaty that solves the problem of reci-
procity and works against the danger of investment protectionism.118 The
question has to be answered as to whether such a treaty should be conceived
as a stand-alone agreement or if it should be anchored within an existing
international organization, such as the WTO. In our view, the latter seems
preferable because important diplomatic work has already been conducted,
and the dispute settlement within WTO works effectively. As the topic of
FDI control is at the core of national sovereignty, the high political accept-
ance of the WTO dispute settlement process is an important reason for the
choice of this forum. Hence, the investment topic should be reinserted into
the WTO agenda. The state control of cross-border M&A is an example of
the general rule that international problems can only be solved at the inter-
national level.
117 Cf UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010 (New York and Geneva, 2010), 77: ‘[S]ome
countries have set up or reinforced regulatory mechanisms for screening FDI that, in prac-
tice, could become protectionist tools.’
118 Cf UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011 (New York and Geneva, 2011), 110: ‘Achieving
a balance between the sovereign right to regulate an industry, and the need to avoid invest-
ment protectionism, remains a major policy challenge.’ See also Syed Tariq Anwar, ‘FDI
Regimes, Investment Screening Process, and Institutional Frameworks: China versus Others
in Global Business’, 46 Journal of World Trade 213 (2012), 228.
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